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Abstract—Anonymization technique has been extensively studied and widely applied for privacy-preserving data publishing. In most
previous approaches, a microdata table consists of three categories of attribute: explicit-identifier, quasi-identifier (QI), and sensitive
attribute. Actually, different individuals may have different view on the sensitivity of different attributes. Therefore, there is another type
of attribute that contains both QI values and sensitive values, namely, semi-sensitive attribute. Based on such observation, we propose
a new anonymization technique, called local generalization and bucketization, to prevent identity disclosure and protect the sensitive
values on each semi-sensitive attribute and sensitive attribute. The rationale is to use local generalization and local bucketization to
divide the tuples into local equivalence groups and partition the sensitive values into local buckets, respectively. The protections of local
generalization and local bucketization are independent, so that they can be implemented by appropriate algorithms without weakening
other protection, respectively. Besides, the protection of local bucketization for each semi-sensitive attribute and sensitive attribute is
also independent. Consequently, local bucketization can comply with various principles in different attributes according to the actual
requirements of anonymization. The conducted extensive experiments illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
Index Terms—Privacy preservation, data publication, local generalization, local bucketization.
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1 INTRODUCTION
W ITH human society enters the age of big data, thevariety of individual information, such as income
investigation, medical information, and demographic cen-
sus, has been collected by corporations and governments.
These massive personal data are used in data mining and
machine learning that contributes to corporations to create
business values and governments to develop policies, and
also provides people with a more intelligent and convenient
way of life. Under the promotion of big data technology,
the information barriers between various industries and
government departments are gradually broken, and the
exchanges and sharings of microdata have become increas-
ingly important activities. However, the published data al-
ways contain privacy information. These data may disclose
the secrets of individuals if the microdata are published
without any disguise.
Many anonymization techniques, such as generaliza-
tion [1] and bucketization [2], are proposed for privacy-
preserving data publishing. In these approaches, the at-
tributes in microdata table are classified into three cate-
gories: (1) Explicit-Identifier, which can uniquely or mostly
identify the record owner and must be removed from the
published table; (2) Quasi-Identifier (QI), which can be
used to re-identify the record owner when taken together;
and (3) Sensitive attribute, which contains the confidential
information of individuals.
Generalization transforms the values on QI attributes
into general forms, and the tuples whose generalized val-
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ues are the same constitute an equivalence group. As a
result, the records in the same equivalence group are in-
distinguishable. While bucketization divides the tuples into
buckets that breaks the relation between QI attributes and
sensitive attributes. Therefore, every record corresponds to
the diverse sensitive values within the bucket.
1.1 Motivation
Previous approaches always suppose that an attribute in-
cludes only QI values or sensitive values. In fact, different
individuals may view different data values as sensitive on
the same attribute. Thus, an attribute may contain both QI
values and sensitive values, which is considered as semi-
sensitive.
For example, a hospital releases some diagnosis records
of patients, as shown in Figure 1(b), to allow researchers to
study the characteristics of various diseases. In the micro-
data table, each attribute except ID has a flag that marks
whether a tuple treats her/his value as sensitive (e.g., the
tuple with ID 1002 does not care her age value is known
by others, but the one with ID 1007 wants to keep secret).
In consequence, the attributes of age and zip code are semi-
sensitive in the microdata table because they contain both
QI values and sensitive values.
Suppose that an adversary has the background knowl-
edge as shown in Figure 1(a) and obtains the microdata
table of Figure 1(b). Knowing that Mark went to the hospital
before and matching by his values of gender and zip code,
the adversary infers that: (1) his record is with ID 1004 in the
microdata table; and (2) his age is 24 and disease is pneu-
monia. The goal of preventing such privacy disclosures has
resulted in the development of many anonymization tech-
niques (see survey [3]). Note that, previous generalization
and bucketization anonymize whole attributes rather than
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Fig. 1. (a) The background knowledge of adversary, (b) the microdata table, (c) the generalized table, (d) the bucketized table
specific values, then they can only regard semi-sensitive
attributes as QI attributes. The generalized and bucketized
versions of Figure 1(b) are given in Figure 1(c) and 1(d),
respectively.
Although generalization effectively prevents identity
disclosure, it always suffers from serious information loss
as proposed by [4], [5], [6]. Almost all the values are irre-
versibly generalized that hinders recipients from analyzing
data information. For example, Figure 1(c) stops the ad-
versary from recognizing record owner but in which poor
information utility is preserved for recipients.
While the bucketized table preserves excellent informa-
tion utility, but it only protects the confidential values on
the sensitive attribute without caring personalized privacy
requirements. The sensitive values on the semi-sensitive at-
tributes tend to be revealed when the adversary has enough
background knowledge. For example, the adversary can still
acquire the ID and age of Mark by matching QI values in
Figure 1(d).
In this paper, we propose local generalization and buck-
etization (LGB) technique to address the problem of protect-
ing personalized privacy information. LGB prevents both
disclosures of identities and sensitive values, and also pre-
serves significant information utility. It uses local general-
ization and local bucketization to partition the tuples into
local equivalence groups in which just specific QI values
are generalized and divide the sensitive values into local
buckets within each semi-sensitive attribute and sensitive
attribute, respectively. The detailed formalization and anal-
ysis of LGB are presented in Section 2. Figure 2 shows a
possible anonymized result of Figure 1(b) by LGB.
In Figure 2, the attribute of GID denotes the ID of local
equivalence group, and the flag of BID represents the ID of
local bucket inside the corresponding attribute. Note that,
every local bucket contains only sensitive values, and all
the QI values are generalized by local generalization. For
example, when the adversary matches the QI values of Mark
Fig. 2. The anonymized table by LGB
in Figure 2, he can only infer that Mark’s record ID may
be 1004 and 1008 which belongs to the local equivalence
group of GID 3, and the attribute of age includes the local
buckets of BID 1 and 2 in the local equivalence group. Then
the adversary concludes that Mark’s age may be 24, 31, 29
and 34. For the same reason, the disease value of Mark
may be dyspepsia, pneumonia and bronchitis. As a result,
the adversary can not determine the exact record ID and
sensitive values of target tuple.
1.2 Contributions
This study extends the concept of personalized anonymity
[7]. It assumes that individuals can determine their sensi-
tive values at will, an attribute can be QI, semi-sensitive,
or sensitive, and a microdata table consists of several QI
attributes, semi-sensitive attributes and sensitive attributes.
We suppose the background knowledge of adversary is
that: (1) the adversary does not acquire any sensitive value
on semi-sensitive attribute and sensitive attribute because
people must cautiously keep their confidential information
from strangers; and (2) in the worst case, the adversary
knows the existences and QI values of all the individuals
in microdata table. The adversary aims to obtain the ID and
3sensitive values of target person from the anonymized table.
Our contributions are as follows.
First, we propose LGB technique to protect personalized
privacy information. LGB combines with local generaliza-
tion and local bucketization to provide secure protections
for identities and sensitive values, and it also reduces in-
formation loss as far as possible. The protections of local
generalization and local bucketization are independent, so
that they can be achieved by appropriate algorithms without
weakening the other protection, separately. Additionally,
the protection of local bucketization in each semi-sensitive
attribute and sensitive attribute is also independent. There-
fore, local bucketization can comply with different princi-
ples in the different attributes according to the practical
demands of anonymization.
Second, we illustrate the effective protections of LGB
for identities and sensitive values based on satisfying the
principles of k-anonymity and l-diversity, respectively, i.e.,
for each tuple, the probabilities of the disclosures of identity
and sensitive values are at most 1/k and 1/l, respectively.
Moreover, since the protections are independent, either de-
gree of protections can be flexibly adjusted according to
the actual requirements without reducing the other level of
defense, severally.
Third, an efficient algorithm is presented to achieve LGB
complying with k-anonymity and l-diversity. The algorithm
contains two main parts, which are local generalization
and local bucketization, to partition the tuples into local
equivalence groups and divide the sensitive values into
local buckets, respectively. We also propose two different al-
gorithms to implement local generalization based on multi-
dimensional partition and minimizing normalized certainty
penalty (NCP) for different utilization purposes, separately.
Furthermore, the range of each local bucket is minimized as
far as possible to preserve more information utility.
Last but not least, we conduct a large number of ex-
periments to illustrate the basic property of LGB and the
different performances between the two proposed local gen-
eralization algorithms through the results of discernibility
metric measurement, NCP, and aggregate query answering.
The effect of the density of the sensitive values in semi-
sensitive attributes is also studied.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
proposes the formalization and analysis of LGB. Section 3
presents an algorithms to achieve LGB. Section 4 shows the
results and analysis of experiments. Section 5 describes the
related studies. Section 6 concludes the paper and proposes
the directions for future studies.
2 LGB
2.1 Concepts
The formalization of LGB technique requires certain prior
and novel concepts. We first re-define the categories of
attribute based on the property of data value as follows.
Definition 1 (QI Attribute). An attribute is considered as a
QI attribute, denoted as AQI , iff the attribute contains only QI
values.
Definition 2 (Sensitive Attribute). An attribute is considered
as a sensitive attribute, denoted as ASA, iff the attribute contains
only sensitive values.
Definition 3 (Semi-Sensitive Attribute). An attribute is con-
sidered as a semi-sensitive attribute, denoted as ASS , iff the
attribute contains both QI values and sensitive values.
The new definitions of attribute allow individuals to
customize their own privacy requirement, and releaser can
employ appropriate anonymization approaches to protect
people’s personalized privacy information and preserve
worthy data utilizability according to the characters of dif-
ferent attributes.
Definition 4 (Partition and QI Group). A partition consists of
several subsets of T , such that each tuple belongs to exactly one
subset, and each subset is called a QI group. Specifically, let there
be m QI groups {G1, G2, · · · , Gm}, then
⋃m
i=1Gi = T , and for
any 1 ≤ i1 6= i2 ≤ m, Gi1 ∩Gi2 = ∅.
QI group has different performances when using differ-
ent anonymization approaches. In generalization, the tuples
in the same QI group have the same QI values. While in
bucketization, each QI group is divided into two sub-tables,
each containing QI values and sensitive values, respectively.
Definition 5 (Equivalence Group). Given a partition of T with
m QI groups, each QI group is called an equivalence group, if for
any tuple t ∈ T , a generalized table of T contains the tuple t of
the form:
(Gj [1], Gj [2], · · · , Gj [d], t[ASA]),
where Gj(1 ≤ j ≤ m) is the unique QI group including t,
Gj [i](1 ≤ i ≤ d) is the generalized value on AQIi for all the
tuples in Gj , and t[ASA] represents t’s value on ASA.
Definition 6 (Bucket). Given a partition of T withmQI groups,
each QI group is called a bucket, if each QI group is represented
as the form:
QIT (QI,BID) and SAT (SA,BID),
where QI and SA are the QI values and sensitive values of the
tuples in the QI group, respectively, and BID denotes the ID of
bucket.
In previous equivalence groups, all the whole attributes
including QI values are generalized to the same form that
always causes overprotection. We propose local generaliza-
tion technique based on the new definitions of attribute to
partition the tuples into local equivalence groups through
generalizing just specific QI values.
Definition 7 (QI Partition). For any tuple t ∈ T , QI[t]
represents the set of the attributes containing t’s QI values, such
that
QI[t] = {A|t[A] is a QI value}.
A QI partition of T divides the table into disjoint subsets
{T1, T2, · · · , Tm}, such that for any 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m,
Ti ∩ Tj = ∅,
⋃m
i=1 Ti = T , and for any ti1 , ti2 ∈ Ti,
QI[ti1 ] = QI[ti2 ].
Definition 8 (Local Equivalence Group). Given a microdata
table T and a QI partition of T with m subsets, each subset is
4(a) (b)
Fig. 3. (a) The first partition, (b) the second partition
called a local equivalence group, if the QI values are generalized
to the same form in the corresponding attribute, such that for any
tuple t ∈ T , a locally generalized table of T contains the tuple t
of the form:
(LEGj [A
QI
1 ], · · · , LEGj [AQIp ], t[ASA1 ], · · · , t[ASAq ]),
where LEGj(1 ≤ j ≤ m) is the unique local equivalence group
including t, AQIi1 (1 ≤ i1 ≤ p) and ASAi2 (1 ≤ i2 ≤ q) denote the
attributes containing QI value and sensitive value of t in LEGj ,
respectively, LEGj [AQI ] is the generalized value on AQI for all
the tuples in LEGj , and t[ASA] represents t’s value on attribute
ASA.
Local generalization contains two partition steps. First,
it divides the tuples into subsets by QI partition in which
all the records carry the QI values on the same attributes.
For example, in Figure 3(a), the tuples with ID 1001 and
1002 are in the same subset because both of them just carry
QI values on the attributes of age and gender. Next, local
generalization partitions the tuples into local equivalence
groups within each subset, and generalizes their QI values.
For example, the tuples in the subset of GID 3 in Figure 3(a)
are divided into the local equivalence groups of GID 3 and
4 in Figure 3(b), and every group in Figure 3(b) is a local
equivalence group.
Likewise, previous bucketization protects for the whole
sensitives attribute rather than specific sensitive values. We
present local bucketization technique to partition the sensi-
tive values into local buckets in the corresponding attribute.
Definition 9 (Local Bucket). For any semi-sensitive attribute or
sensitive attribute in T , the sensitive values are partitioned into
local buckets, and each local bucket has the form:
IDT (ID,BID) and SAT (SA,BID),
where ID and SA represent the IDs and sensitive values of the
tuples in the local bucket, respectively, and BID denotes the ID
of local bucket within the attribute.
For example, in Figure 4, the tuples with ID 1004 and
1005 are in the same local bucket of BID 1 within the
attribute of age, but they are in the different local buckets
of BID 2 and 3 within the attribute of disease. Therefore, the
local buckets within the different attributes are independent.
Note that, the previous equivalence groups and buckets
can be treated as the special cases of local equivalence
groups and local buckets when the microdata table does
Fig. 4. The locally bucketized table
not contain any semi-sensitive attribute, respectively. Based
on Definition 8 and 9, we define LGB technique as follows.
Definition 10 (Local Generalization and Bucketization).
Given a microdata table T , a local generalization and bucketi-
zation of T is given by the partitions of local generalization and
local bucketization, and every tuple and sensitive value belongs to
exactly one local equivalence group and local bucket, respectively.
2.2 Protection Analysis
In this section, we analyze the protections of local gen-
eralization and local bucketization against the disclosures
of identities and sensitive values in detail. Without loss of
generality, we illustrate how local generalization and local
bucketization comply with k-anonymity [8] and l-diversity
[9], respectively. Then, we prove the locally generalized
and bucketized table can also satisfy k-anonymity and l-
diversity by meeting the corresponding conditions. We first
consider the protection against identity disclosure in the
locally generalized table and have the following lemma and
corollary.
Lemma 1. Given a locally generalized table, for any tuple t ∈
T , the probability of identity disclosure is at most 1/|LEG(t)|,
where LEG(t) is the local equivalence group including t.
Proof. According to Definition 8, the tuples in the same
local equivalence group have the same attributes containing
QI values, and all the QI values are generalized to the
same form. Consequently, the adversary must obtain at least
|LEG(t)| possible tuples by matching QI values, then the
probability of identity disclosure is at most 1/|LEG(t)|.
Corollary 1. A locally generalized table complies with k-
anonymity, if every local equivalence group contains at least k
tuples.
5Proof. Given a locally generalized table in which every local
equivalence group includes at least k tuples, for any tuple
t ∈ T , we have
|LEG(t)| ≥ k,
where |LEG(t)| is the size of the local equivalence group
including t. Then
1
|LEG(t)| ≤ 1k .
According to Lemma 1, the probability of identity disclosure
for any tuple is at most 1/k. Therefore, the locally general-
ized table complies with k-anonymity.
Next, we discuss the protection for sensitive values in the
locally bucketized table. Suppose an adversary knows t’s
existence and QI values, then attempts to infer t’s sensitive
value s from the locally bucketized table. The adversary
needs to find t’s possible records in the locally bucketized
table by matching the QI values.
Definition 11 (Matching Tuple). Given a locally bucketized
table T buc, and for any tuple t ∈ T , a tuple mt ∈ T buc is a
matching tuple of t if each QI value of t matches that of mt.
Definition 12 (Matching Bucket). Given a locally bucketized
table T buc, and for any tuple t ∈ T , a local bucket mb within an
attribute is a matching bucket of t if there is at least a matching
tuple of t in mb.
For example, when the adversary matches Mark in the
locally bucketized table of Figure 4, he can infer that Mark’s
matching tuple is with ID 1004, and the matching buckets
inside the attributes of age and disease are with ID 1 and 2,
respectively.
We denote p(t, s) as the probability that the sensitive
value s of t is exposed, and let p(t, b) represent the proba-
bility that t is in the bucket b. Then we have the following
lemma and corollary.
Lemma 2. Given a locally bucketized table, for any tuple t ∈ T ,
the probability that any sensitive value s of t is exposed is as
follows:
p(t, s) ≤∑mb p(t,mb) |mb(s′)||mb| ,
where |mb(s′)| is the number of the most occurrence sensitive
value s′ in the matching bucket mb, and |mb| is the size of mb.
Proof. To acquire the sensitive value s, the adversary has to
calculate the probabilities that t exists in each local bucket
and t carries the sensitive value s within each local bucket.
Then, the adversary has:
p(t, s) =
∑
B p(t, b)p(s|t, b),
where p(s|t, b) denotes the probability that t carries the
sensitive value s given that t is in the local bucket b. The
adversary eliminates the local bucket that does not contain
any matching tuple of t, expressed as follows:
p(t, b) = 0, if @mt ∈ b.
According to Definition 12, we have:
p(t, s) =
∑
mb p(t,mb)p(s|t,mb),
The most occurrence sensitive value s′ in mb is expressed
as:
|mb(s)| ≤ |mb(s′)|.
Thus:
p(s|t,mb) = |mb(s)||mb| ≤ |mb(s
′)|
|mb| ,
then:
p(t, s) =
∑
mb p(t,mb)p(s|t,mb) ≤
∑
mb p(t,mb)
|mb(s′)|
|mb| .
Corollary 2. A locally bucketized table complies with l-diversity
principle, if every local bucket satisfies the conditions: (1) each
sensitive value appears at most once in the local bucket; and (2)
the size of each local bucket is at least l.
Proof. According to Lemma 2, for any tuple t ∈ T , we have
p(t, s) ≤∑mb p(t,mb) |mb(s′)||mb| .
We confine that each sensitive value appears at most once
inside the local bucket, such that for any s ∈ T ,
|mb(s)| ≤ 1.
And for any local bucket b, we have:
|b| ≥ l.
Then:
p(t, s) ≤∑mb p(t,mb) |mb(s′)||mb| ≤ 1l ∑mb p(t,mb) = 1l .
In consequence, the locally bucketized table complies with
l-diversity by meeting the conditions.
Finally, we prove that a locally generalized and buck-
etized table complies with k-anonymity and l-diversity
through satisfying the conditions in Corollary 1 and 2.
Corollary 3. A locally generalized and bucketized table complies
with k-anonymity and l-diversity by meeting the conditions as
follows: (1) each local equivalence group contains at least k tuples;
(2) each sensitive value appears at most once inside each local
bucket; and (3) the size of each local bucket is at least l.
Proof. According to Definition 10, the protections of local
generalization and local bucketization are independent, and
the conditions in Corollary 1 and 2 are non-overlapping. As
a result, as long as the locally generalized and bucketized
table satisfies the corresponding conditions, it complies with
k-anonymity and l-diversity.
Generally, local generalization enhances the protection of
local bucketization because local generalization transforms
QI values into the same form that increases the number of
the matching tuples of target tuple. For example, the tuple
with ID 1006 is in the local bucket of BID 3 within the
attribute of disease in Figure 4, while he is in that of BID
2 and 3 in Figure 2, because his QI values are generalized
to the same form in the local equivalence group of GID 2
that increases the number of his matching tuples. Then the
probability that his disease value is disclosed is decreased
to 1/4.
63 ALGORITHMS
This section presents an algorithm to achieve LGB com-
plying with k-anonymity and l-diversity. In addition, two
algorithms are proposed to implement local generalization
for different utilization purposes. The main procedure of
LGB is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 LGB(T , k, l)
1: Attrisen = {the attributes including sensitive values}
2: Tanony = T
3: for each attr ∈ Attrisen do
4: V aluePairsen = {(id, s)|s ∈ attr and s is sensitive}
5: local bucketization(Tanony, V aluePairsen, l)
6: end for
7: local generalization(Tanony, k)
8: return Tanony
The data structure Attrisen (line 1) stores the attributes
including sensitive values in T , i.e., the set of semi-sensitive
attributes and sensitive attributes. The variable Tanony (line
2) denotes the anonymized result, and it is initialized as
T . In each iteration (lines 3 to 6), the algorithm picks an
attribute from Attrisen and chooses the tuples with sensi-
tive values (line 4). Then the algorithm divides the tuples
into local buckets based on the value of l (line 5). After the
loop, the function local generalization(Tanony, k) divides
Tanony into local equivalence groups according to the value
of k (line 7). Finally, the algorithm returns Tanony as the
anonymized result of T (line 8). Note that, in Algorithm
1, the QI attributes are not contained in Attrisen, and
V aluePairsen does not include any tuple with QI value in
attr. Therefore, none of local buckets contains any QI value.
The procedure comprises two main parts: local bucketi-
zation (line 5) and local generalization (line 7). We elaborate
each part in the rest of this section.
3.1 Local Bucketization
This section presents an efficient algorithm to implement
the function local bucketization(Tanony, V aluePairsen, l)
in Algorithm 1. To preserve more information utility, the
algorithm partitions the tuples in V aluePairsen into local
buckets and minimizes the range of the sensitive values in
each local bucket as far as possible. The detailed procedure
is shown in Algorithm 2.
The algorithm recursively divides V aluePair into
two smaller sets, and their ranges of sensitive values
are non-overlapping. The data structure value number
stores every sensitive value and the number of occurrence
counted in V aluePair (line 1). The algorithm calculates
the median value of the sensitive values based on
their numbers in value number (line 2), and divides
V aluePair into two smaller sets (lines 3 and 4). The
function check condition(V aluePair, l) checks whether
V aluePair can be divided into local buckets complying
with l-diversity (line 5), such that the product of the
number of the most occurrence sensitive value and the
value of l is not more than the size of V aluePair. If both
V Psmall and V Pbig meet the condition, the algorithm
Algorithm 2 local bucketization(T , V aluePair, l)
1: value number = {(value, number)|count in V aluePair}
2: median = calculate median(value number)
3: V Psmall = {(id, s)|(id, s) ∈ V aluePair and s ≤
median}
4: V Pbig = {(id, s)|(id, s) ∈ V aluePair and s > median}
5: if check condition(V Psmall, l) and
check condition(V Pbig, l) then
6: local bucketization(T, V Psmall, l)
7: local bucketization(T, V Pbig, l)
8: else
9: divide buckets(T, V aluePair, l)
10: end if
makes recursive calls of local bucketization(T, V Psmall, l)
and local bucketization(T, V Pbig, l) (lines 6 and
7). Otherwise, the algorithm divides the tuples in
V aluePair into local buckets (line 9). The function
divide buckets(T, V aluePair, l) is implemented by the
assignment algorithm of m-Invariance [10] to satisfy the
conditions in Corollary 2.
Proposition 1. Tanony complies with l-diversity after local
bucketization phase.
Proof. The function divide buckets(T, V aluePair, l) is im-
plemented by the assignment algorithm of m-Invariance,
where the parameters l and m are mathematically equiv-
alent. In each recursion of Algorithm 2, both sets of V Psmall
and V Pbig are checked to satisfy l-eligible condition [10]. Ac-
cording to m-Invariance, the assignment algorithm divides
the tuples into m-unique buckets. Then the size of each
generated local bucket is at least l, and every sensitive value
appears at most once in each local bucket. As a result, all the
local buckets within the corresponding attribute meet the
conditions in Corollary 2 based on the value of l. After the
loop (lines 3 to 6) in Algorithm 1, the tuples with sensitive
values inside each semi-sensitive attribute and sensitive
attribute are partitioned into l-unique local buckets, so that
Tanony satisfies l-diversity principle.
3.2 Local Generalization
In this section, we propose two algorithms to implement
local generalization based on multi-dimensional partition
and minimizing NCP, separately. The experiments we con-
ducted in Section 4 will show their different performances.
We elaborate each algorithm as follows.
3.2.1 Based on Multi-Dimensional Partition
Previous multi-dimensional partition [11] is an effective
and popular approach to divide the tuples into equiva-
lence groups. However, it does not apply to the publishing
scenario of personalized privacy requirement. We combine
multi-dimensional partition and QI partition to divide the
tuples into local equivalence groups according to their spe-
cific QI values.
Definition 13 (Multi-Dimensional QI Partition). Given a
microdata table T with d attributes and a QI partition with
7m subsets {T1, T2, · · · , Tm}, a multi-dimensional QI partition
divides the tuples into non-overlapping multi-dimensional regions
within each subset that coversD[Ai1]×D[Ai2]×· · ·×D[Aid](1 ≤
i ≤ m), where D[Aij ](1 ≤ j ≤ d) denotes the domain
of attribute Aj inside subset Ti, and for any tuple t ∈ T ,
(t[A1], t[A2], · · · , t[Ad]) is mapped in the unique region.
To reduce information loss as far as possible, the size
of each local equivalence group should be minimized to
only satisfy k-anonymity, so that each region is divided into
smaller ones until at least one of their sizes is less than
k. Algorithm 3 describes the local generalization based on
multi-dimensional partition in detail.
Algorithm 3 local generalization(T, k)
1: Tanony = ∅
2: Tsubsets = {the subsets of T divided by QI partition}
3: for each Tset ∈ Tsubsets do
4: partition set = {Tset}
5: while partition set 6= ∅ do
6: oper set = pick set(partition set)
7: partition set = partition set− oper set
8: QI set = QI[oper set]
9: partition flag = false
10: while QI set 6= ∅ do
11: attri = choose dimension(oper set,QI set)
12: split value = cal median(oper set, attri)
13: Sl = {t|t ∈ oper set and t[attri] ≤ split value}
14: Sr = {t|t ∈ oper set and t[attri] > split value}
15: if |Sl| ≥ k and |Sr| ≥ k then
16: partition set = partition set+ Sl
17: partition set = partition set+ Sr
18: partition flag = true
19: break
20: else
21: QI set = QI set− attri
22: end if
23: end while
24: if partition flag is false then
25: gen set = generalize(oper set)
26: Tanony = Tanony + gen set
27: end if
28: end while
29: end for
30: return Tanony
The data structures Tanony and Tsubsets store the
anonymized result and the subsets of T divided by QI
partition, respectively (lines 1 and 2). In each iteration (lines
3 to 29), the algorithm picks and divides a subset Tset into
local equivalence groups. The data structure partition set
contains the sets of tuples which has not been generalized,
and it includes Tset in the beginning (line 4). As long as
partition set is not empty (line 5), the algorithm picks and
eliminates a set from partition set (lines 6 and 7). The data
structure QI set denotes the set of the attributes including
QI values in oper set (line 8), and partition flag represents
whether oper set can be divided (line 9). While QI set
is not empty (line 10), the algorithm chooses an attribute
attri and calculates the median value (lines 11 and 12), then
divides oper set into two smaller sets (lines 13 and 14). If
the sizes of Sl and Sr are both bigger than or equal to k
(line 15), the algorithm adds Sl and Sr into partition set
(lines 16 and 17) and sets partition flag as true (line 18),
then breaks the while loop (line 19). Otherwise, attri is
eliminated from QI set (line 21). If partition flag is false
after the while loop, not a single attribute can be used to
divide oper set into the smaller sets that complies with
k-anonymity (line 24). The algorithm generalizes the QI
values in oper set and adds the generalized set gen set
into Tanony (lines 25 and 26). Finally, the algorithm returns
Tanony as the generalized result (line 30).
Local generalization based on multi-dimensional parti-
tion is well suited as a common approach because it evenly
divides the tuples into local equivalence groups that reduces
much information loss. In practice, some microdata tables
are published for particular purposes, and the informa-
tion utility should be evaluated by given metric. Next, we
present another algorithm to achieve local generalization
which preserves information utility evaluated by specific
metric as far as possible.
3.2.2 Based on Minimizing NCP
In this section, we propose a utility-based algorithm to
implement local generalization through using NCP [12] as
information metric. For any tuple t ∈ T , t’s value v is
generalized to v∗ on the categorical attribute Acat, then
NCPAcat(t) =
size(v∗)
|Acat| ,
where size(v∗) is the number of the leaf nodes that are the
descendants of v∗ in the hierarchy tree of Acat, and |Acat|
denotes the number of distinct values on attribute Acat.
While t’s value v is generalized to [v∗lower, v
∗
upper] on the
numeric attribute Anum, then
NCPAnum(t) =
v∗upper−v∗lower
range(Anum)
,
where v∗lower and v
∗
upper are the lower bound and upper
bound of generalized range, respectively, and range(Anum)
is the range of all the values on attribute Anum. The infor-
mation loss of whole generalized table is represented as
NCP (T ) =
∑
t∈T
∑d
i=1NCPAi(t).
The local generalization complying with k-anonymity
based on minimizing NCP is described as Algorithm 4. The
data structures Tanony and Tsubsets store the anonymized
result and the subsets of T divided by QI partition, respec-
tively (lines 1 and 2). In each iteration (lines 3 to 24), the
algorithm picks and divides a subset Tset into local equiv-
alence groups (line 3). The data structure QI set denotes
the set of the attributes including QI values in Tset (line
4), and partition set represents the sets of tuples which
has not been generalized (line 5). While partition set is
not empty (line 6), the algorithm picks and eliminates a set
oper set from partition set (lines 7 and 8). If the size of
oper set is smaller than 2k (line 9), the tuples in oper set
are generalized and added into Tanony (lines 10 and 11).
Otherwise, the function find seeds(oper set,QI set) re-
turns two seed records that maximizes the value of NCP
based on QI set (line 13), and the algorithm divides
oper set into two smaller sets according to the seed tu-
ples (line 14). The functions find seeds(oper set,QI set)
8and divide table(oper set, sd1, sd2, QI set) can be imple-
mented by the top-down algorithm in [12]. Next, if the sizes
of T1 and T2 are both more than or equal to k, the algo-
rithm adds them into partition set (lines 15 to 17), or else,
oper set is generalized and added into Tanony (lines 18 to
20). Finally, the algorithm returns Tanony as the generalized
result (line 25).
Algorithm 4 local generalization(T, k)
1: Tanony = ∅
2: Tsubsets = {the subsets of T divided by QI partition}
3: for each Tset ∈ Tsubsets do
4: QI set = QI[Tset]
5: partition set = {Tset}
6: while partition set 6= ∅ do
7: oper set = pick set(partition set)
8: partition set = partition set− oper set
9: if |oper set| < 2k then
10: gen set = generalize(oper set)
11: Tanony = Tanony + gen set
12: else
13: sd1, sd2 = find seeds(oper set,QI set)
14: T1, T2 = divide table(oper set, sd1, sd2, QI set)
15: if |T1| ≥ k and |T2| ≥ k then
16: partition set = partition set+ T1
17: partition set = partition set+ T2
18: else
19: gen set = generalize(oper set)
20: Tanony = Tanony + gen set
21: end if
22: end if
23: end while
24: end for
25: return Tanony
Proposition 2. Tanony complies with k-anonymity after local
generalization phase.
Proof. In both Algorithm 3 and 4, the size of subset must be
more than or equal to k prior to putting it into partition set,
and only oper set selected from partition set is general-
ized and added into Tanony . Therefore, the sizes of all the
local equivalence groups are at least k that satisfies the
condition in Corollary 1. Then Tanony satisfies k-anonymity
principle.
4 EXPERIMENTS
This section evaluates the efficiency of LGB technique. We
use the real US Census data [?], eliminate the tuples with
missing values, and randomly select 31,055 tuples with nine
attributes. The QI attributes are relationship, marital status,
race, education and hours per week, the semi-sensitive
attributes are sex, age and occupation, and the sensitive
attribute is salary. Table 1 describes the attributes in detail.
In Section 3, we propose an algorithms to implement
LGB that satisfies k-anonymity to prevent identity disclo-
sure and l-diversity to protect sensitive values. However,
the attribute of sex contains only two distinct sensitive
TABLE 1
Description of the attributes
Attribute Value Type Sensitivity Type Size
1 Sex Categorical Semi-sensitive 2
2 Age Continuous Semi-sensitive 73
3 Relationship Categorical QI 13
4 Marital status Categorical QI 6
5 Race Categorical QI 9
6 Education Categorical QI 11
7 Hours per week Continuous QI 93
8 Occupation Categorical Semi-sensitive 257
9 Salary Continuous Sensitive 719
values, namely, male and female, so that complying with l-
diversity principle can not provide effective protection. We
severally employ t-closeness [13] to confine the attribute
of sex and l-diversity to protect the rest semi-sensitive
attributes and sensitive attribute. In addition, the algorithms
based on multi-dimensional partition and minimizing NCP
are denoted as LGB MDP and LGB NCP, respectively. The
experiments will show: (1) the basic property of LGB tech-
nique and the different performances between LGB MDP
and LGB NCP; and (2) the effect of the density of sensitive
values in the semi-sensitive attributes.
4.1 Information Metrics
In this section, the experiments employ two information
metrics, namely, discernibility metric measurement [14] and
NCP, to check the information utility. The parameters k is
assigned to 5, 8 and 10, and l is assigned to 5, 8, 10, 12,
15, 18 and 20, respectively, and t is fixed at 0.2. Besides,
the percentage of the sensitive values in each semi-sensitive
attribute is set to about 20%.
The first experiment uses discernability metric measure-
ment, denoted as CDM , which is given by the equation:
CDM =
∑
LEG |LEG|2,
where LEG is the local equivalence group, and |LEG|
denotes the size of LEG. A smaller value of CDM means
less generalization and perturbation in the anonymization
process. Figure 5(a) and 5(b) present the results of the
anonymized table by LGB MDP and LGB NCP, respec-
tively.
It is obvious that the discernability penalty of LGB MDP
is much lower than that of LGB NCP, so that LGB MDP
divides the tuples into local equivalence groups more evenly
than LGB NCP. Besides, the sizes of local equivalence
groups are hardly affected by l because the values of dis-
cernability penalty are the same when the value of k is
fixed. Therefore, the results indicate that the protection of
local generalization is barely affected by local bucketization.
Next, the experiment uses NCP as information metric
to compare the information quality between LGB MDP
and LGB NCP. Figure 6(a) and 6(b) present the results
of LGB MDP and LGB NCP, respectively. It is shown
that the values of LGB NCP are clearly lower than that
of LGB MDP by about 14% to 17% although LGB MDP
divides the tuples into local equivalence groups more
evenly than LGB NCP. Thus, the utility-based heuristic of
LGB NCP plays a role in reducing NCP. It proves that
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LGB is a flexible framework which can be implemented by
appropriate algorithms to meet different actual demands.
4.2 Query Answering
In this experiment, we use the approach of aggregate query
answering [15] to check information utility. We randomly
generate 1,000 queries and calculate the average relative
error for each anonymized table. The sequence of query is
expressed as the form:
SELECT SUM(salary) FROM Microdata
WHERE pred(A1) AND pred(A2) AND pred(A3) AND
pred(A4).
Specifically, the query condition contains four random QI
attributes or semi-sensitive attributes, and the sum of salary
is the result for comparison. For categorical attributes, the
predicate pred(A) has the following form:
(A = v1 or A = v2 or · · · or A = vm),
where vi(1 ≤ i ≤ m) is a random value from D[A].
While for numerical attributes, the predicate pred(A) has
the following form:
(A > v) or (A < v) or (A = v)
or (A ≥ v) or (A ≤ v) or (A 6= v),
where v is a random value from D[A]. According to [15],
the relative error rate, denoted as Rerror, is given by the
equation:
Rerror = (Sumupper − Sumlower)/Sumact,
where Sumupper and Sumlower are the upper bound and
lower bound of the sum of salary, respectively, and Sumact
is the actual value.
According to [15], Sumupper and Sumlower are calcu-
lated through ”numbers of hits” in the group. However,
each tuple is contained in the local buckets of different
semi-sensitive attributes, we need to count the upper bound
and lower bound of the possible numbers of the tuples
who satisfies the query conditions in each local bucket of
salary. Let Prot(A) denote the probability that t matches
the condition on attribute A, and Pro(t) represents the
probability that t satisfies the query conditions, then we
have
Pro(t) =
∏
A Prot(A).
For each local bucket within salary, we calculate the sum of
probabilities, then round down and round up the sum as
the lower bound and upper bound of the number of tuples,
respectively. Next, we count the lower bound and upper
bound of the sum of salary in the local bucket through
help table, denoted as Sumlower(b) and Sumupper(b), re-
spectively. The lower bound and upper bound of the sum of
salary in the whole table are expressed as
Sumlower =
∑
B Sumlower(b),
and
Sumupper =
∑
B Sumupper(b).
Figure 7(a) and 7(b) show the results of aggregate query
answering of LGB MDP and LGB NCP, respectively. The
relative error rate increases with the growth of the value of k
or l, and it is more affected by k than that of l. Consequently,
local generalization has more influence on information util-
ity than local bucketization. Note that, LGB MDP has lower
relative error rates than LGB NCP when l is small, because
LGB MDP divides the tuples into local equivalence groups
more evenly than LGB NCP that narrows the ranges of gen-
eralized values. But with the growth of l, the relative error
rates of LGB MDP is gradually close to that of LGB NCP,
because the ranges of local buckets are large enough to
cover the query conditions, then local bucketization has
more and more important influence on information utility.
In conclusion, LGB MDP is better than LGB NCP if the
value of l is small, otherwise, LGB MDP and LGB NCP
perform very equal.
4.3 Effect of Density
In this experiment, we check the effect of the density of the
sensitive values in semi-sensitive attributes on LGB MDP.
The percentages of sensitive values are set to about 10%,
20%, 30% and 40% in each semi-sensitive attribute, re-
spectively, and the rest configurations are the same as the
previous experiments. The results are evaluated through
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aggregate query answering, and Figure 8(a), 8(b), 8(c), and
8(d) present the results of the percentages of 10%, 20%, 30%
and 40%, respectively.
With the density of sensitive values increases, the rel-
ative error rate is declined. The most obvious reduction
is in Figure 8(d), where the percentage of sensitive values
is about 40%, and the values of k and l are 10 and 20,
respectively. It is mainly because more values are divided
into local buckets rather than that of equivalence groups,
and the values are indistinguishable in equivalence groups
but are specific in local buckets, so that less QI values
narrow the ranges of generalized values, and more sensitive
values do not loss the accuracies in local buckets and even
compose more local buckets in which the ranges are further
decreased.
5 RELATED WORK
Privacy-preserving data publishing determines an opti-
mal trade-off between privacy protection and information
preservation. Above all, the most important factor in apply-
ing appropriate anonymization technique is assuming the
publishing scenario. Most research focus on anonymizing
a single and static release so far. However, there are more
complicated data publishing environments in actual appli-
cations, such as multiple release publishing [16], continuous
data publishing [17], [18], and collaborative data publishing
[19]. Moreover, personalized privacy preserving [7] is also
an important publishing scenario because publishers always
ignore the concrete needs of individuals which may causes
serious privacy disclosures.
Secondly, an anonymity principle should be chosen or
proposed to provide secure protections against privacy dis-
closures according to the assumed background knowledge
and purpose of adversary. Generally, the privacy threats
can be divided into four categories, which are member-
ship disclosure, identity disclosure, attribute disclosure, and
probabilistic disclosure. Many useful anonymity principles
can be used to prevent these privacy attacks. k-Anonymity
[8] is one of the most powerful and widespread prin-
ciples for protecting sensitive information, especially for
defending identity attack. l-Diversity [9] and t-closeness
[13] are popular and effective principles for preventing
attribute disclosure. δ-Presence [20] and (d, γ)-privacy [21]
hinder membership disclosure and probabilistic disclosure,
respectively. Note that, according to Dwork [22], the abso-
lute privacy protection is impossible. Therefore, a robust
anonymity framework is supposed to prevent most leak-
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ages of confidential information through combining various
principles. Additionally, differential privacy [23], which is
an effective model for protecting statistic data, does not
need to assume the background knowledge of adversary.
It prevents different disclosures of queries through adding
noise based on different mechanisms [24], [25], [26], [27],
[28].
Finally, an explicit algorithm should be presented that
complies with anonymity principle and minimizes informa-
tion loss as far as possible. For example, slicing [29] comply-
ing with l-diversity principle protects sensitive attributes,
prevents attribute disclose and membership disclosure to
some extent, and preserves better data utility than gener-
alization. Microaggregation [30] is a flexible technique that
satisfies k-anonymous t-closeness through merging clusters,
and it can also adjust the priority of k-anonymity and t-
closeness according to actual demands, such that microag-
gregation can choose to preserve more information utility by
k-anonymity-first or provide more information security by
t-closeness-first. Cross-bucket generalization [31] complies
with (k, l)-anonymity principle to prevent identity disclo-
sure and attribute disclosure. It not only provides greater
security for sensitive attribute but also preserves more in-
formation utility than generalization when the demand of
attribute protection is higher than that of identity protection.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STUDY
This paper supposes that people can optionally set their
sensitive values according to the personal requirements, and
proposes a novel technique, namely, local generalization
and bucketization, to provide secure protections for identi-
ties and sensitive values. The rationale is to divide the tuples
into local equivalence groups and partition the sensitive
values into local buckets through local generalization and
local bucketization, respectively. Furthermore, the protec-
tions of local generalization and local bucketization are
independent, thus their algorithms can be flexibly achieved
according to practical requirements without weakening the
other protection, respectively.
LGB is a flexible framework that can be used in many
publishing scenarios for protecting confidential information.
In the future study, we will combine with the approach of
online learning that automatically protects the incremental
publishing data. Additionally, the individual relationships,
which is also considered as sensitive, are recommended to
be studied in accordance with LGB.
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